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CAN A STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROHIBIT THE EXPORTATION OF
GROUNDWATER OUTSIDE THE STATE?
I. THE FACTS.
A. Joy Sporhase and Delmer Moss are residents of
Colorado. In 1972, they purchased adjacent
and contiguous tracts of land in Phillips
County, Colorado, and Chase County, Nebraska.
On the Nebraska tract, a few feet from the
state line, was an irrigation well which had
been constructed by the prior owners of the
property. Sporhase and Moss installed a center
pivot sprinkler irrigation system on the
Colorado tract and an underground pipe from
the Nebraska well to the sprinkler system to
irrigate the Colorado tract.
B. Neither Sporhase and Moss nor the previous
owners had applied for a permit to transport
ground water from the Nebraska well for use
in Colorado in compliance with a Nebraska
statute. Upon receipt of a complaint, the
Nebraska Department of Water Resources advised
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Sporhase and Moss in 1976 that they were
transporting ground water outside Nebraska
in violation of Nebraska law.
C. In 1977, the Nebraska Attorney General
initiated an action against Sporhase and
Moss to enjoin them from transporting ground
water from the Nebraska well for use in
Colorado.
D. On May 8, 1981, the Nebraska Supreme Court
rejected Sporhase and Moss's argument that
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978)
was unconstitutional. The case is presently
on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
II. THE STATUTES.
A. The Nebraska Statute:
46-613.01. Any person, firm,
city, village, municipal corp
oration or any other entity
intending to withdraw ground
water from any well or pit
located in the State of Nebraska
and transport it for use in an
adjoining state shall apply to
the Department of Water Resources
for a permit to do so. If the
Director of Water Resources
finds that the withdrawal of the
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water requested is reasonable,
is not contrary to the con
servation and use of ground
water, and is not otherwise
detrimental to the public
welfare, he shall grant the
permit if the state in which
the water is to be used grants
reciprocal rights to withdraw
and transport ground water
from that state for use in
the State of Nebraska.
B. The Colorado Statute:
37-90-136. For the purpose of
aiding and preserving unto the
state of Colorado and all its
citizens the use of all ground
waters of this state, whether
^ tributary or nontributary to a
r natural stream, which waters are
necessary for the health and
prosperity of all the citizens
of the state of Colorado, and
for the growth, maintenance, and
general welfare of the state, it
is unlawful for any person to
divert, carry or transport by
ditches, canals, pipelines,
conduits, or any other manner
any of the ground waters of
this state, as said waters are in
this section defined, into any
other state for use therein.
III. THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT DECISION.
A. State ex. rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb
703, 305 N.W. 2d 614 (1981) (Appendix A),
prob. juris, noted, Sporhase v. Nebraska,
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No. 81-613, 102 S. Ct. 631 (Nov. 30, 1981),
argued March 30, 1982.
IV. ISSUES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
1. Whether Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978),
which requires a permit for
the exportation of water
from the state and using the
consideration of reciprocity
of the receiving state's laws,
violates the Commerce Clause,
Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution?
2. Whether the Congress has
exempted the regulation of
water from the application
of the Commerce Clause of
Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution
and left this power to the
states?
3. Whether Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978)
requiring a permit to export
water conditioned upon reci
procity in the receiving
state violates the Equal
Protection or Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United
States Constitution?
V. THREE DECISIONS; THREE APPROACHES TO COMMERCE
CLAUSE CHALLENGES.
A. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S
K-4
349 (1908) (Appendix B). A New Jersey statute
prohibiting the transport of surface waters
for use in another state upheld against a
challenge under the commerce clause on the
grounds, inter alia, that "(a) man may not
acquire a right to property by his desire to
use it in commerce among the states."
B. Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Company, 259 U.S.
498 (1922) (Appendix C). An irrigation company
diverting water from the North Fork of the
Republican River in Colorado which was sold
A for agricultural use on lands in Colorado and
f"
Nebraska brought suit against the Colorado
State Engineer for not enforcing its prior
ity against junior appropriators in Colorado.
The irrigation company alleged that its
federal right to engage in commerce between
the states by transporting water from Colorado
and selling it in Nebraska was being impaired
by Colorado officials. Held, the issue was
governed by the doctrine of equitable apportion
ment of interstate waters. The Pioneer decree
was later incorporated into the Republican




C. City of Altus, Oklahoma v. Carr, 255 F. Supp.
828 (W.D. Tex.), aff d per curiam, 385 U.S.
35 (1966) (Appendix E). A Texas statute pro
hibiting transport of ground water outside the
state without legislative authorization de
clared unconstitutional as an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter distinguished on the
grounds that under the law of the State of
Texas, ground water once reduced to posses
sion is personal property subject to sale and,
therefore, is an article of commerce. '
VI. IS GROUND WATER IN NEBRASKA AN ARTICLE OF COMMERCE?
A. Much attention was devoted in the briefs
filed with the United States Supreme Court to
the question of whether ground water in
Nebraska is an "article of commerce".
Nebraska follows a variant of the American
doctrine of "reasonable use" of ground water.
According to the Nebraska Attorney General,
ground water used for agricultural purposes
can be used only on overlying lands, and is
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therefore not an "article of commerce". But
consider the following exchange between the
Supreme Court and counsel for Sporhase and
Moss:
QUESTION: Now, tell me again. Under
Nebraska law, can — are water rights
transferable between private parties?
MR. DUDDEN: Yes, they are, Your Honor.
QUESTION: For money?
MR. DUDDEN: For money.
QUESTION: And are they -- are they --
can they be separated from the land?
MR. DUDDEN: Yes, I believe they could be.
However, in most instances, Your Honor,
the transfer of water for money is involved
in the price of the land.
* * *
QUESTION: What if I in Nebraska -- what
if your client wanted to -- wanted to sell
his water right to an adjoining landowner?
MR. DUDDEN: He could do that, Your Honor,
but the water registration specifically
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provides for the water to be used on
agricultural land. They call it over
lying agricultural land.
QUESTION: All right. But you can
transfer it to another piece of agricultu
ral land?
MR. DUDDEN: Yes, he could.
QUESTION: And in that sense -- and he
could be paid for it?
MR. DUDDEN: Yes, in Nebraska.
QUESTION: In Nebraska. Now, in that
sense it's an article of commerce.
MR. DUDDEN: Absolutely, absolutely.
QUESTION: But he cannot -- he could
not under this law, I take it, sell
that water right to somebody in Colorado?
MR. DUDDEN: That is correct, Your Honor.
QUESTION: Suppose it's very good water
that your client has on his land. Could






Mr. DUDDEN: Nebraska has -- the Nebraska
Supreme Court has approved the commercial
sale of water for drinking purposes. . .
QUESTION: Well, that gives some hint that
it's an article of commerce, doesn't it?
MR. DUDDEN: I felt that it did, Your Honor,
yes. That's our position.
B. Assuming ground water in Nebraska is an article
of commerce, does the State of Nebraska have any
claim on the basis of sovereignty to prevent
the export of ground water for use outside the
state?
C. Would the answer be different, if the ground
water had been equitably apportioned between
Colorado and Nebraska and Sporhase and Moss
were exporting ground water which had been
apportioned to Nebraska?
D. Does the Nebraska anti-export statute serve
any legitimate state interest in conserving
ground water within the state?
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E. If congress has exempted state regulation of
water from the commerce clause, should City
of Altus, Oklahoma v. Carr be overruled?
F. Does the reciprocity requirement in the
Nebraska statute serve any legitimate state
interest in conserving ground water by pro
moting complementary ground water policies in
adjoining states. Compare Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366 (1976), with Western and Southern Life Ins.
Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, U.S. , ^
101 S. Ct. 2070 (1981).
FURTHER READING
Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce
Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979, Sup.
Ct. Rev. 51.
Ladd, Federal and Interstate Conflicts in Montana Water
Law: Support for a State Water Plan, 42 Mont. L. Rev.
267 (1981).
Schenkkan & Anson, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce
Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 Texas L. Rev.
71 (1980).
White, Reasonable State Regulation of the Interstate
Transfer of Percolating Water, 2 Nat. Resources Law 383
(1969).
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Comment, Do State Water Anti-Exportation Statutes
Violate the Commerce Clause? Or Will New Mexico's
Embargo Law Hold, Nat. Resources J. 617 (1981).
Comment, "It's Our Water". -- Can Wyoming Constitution
ally Prohibit the Exportation of State Waters?, 10
Land & Water L. Rev. 119 (1975).
Note, Interstate Transfer of Water -- The Western
Challenge to the Commerce Clause, 59 Texas L. Rev.
(1981).(forthcoming).
Clyde & Clyde, State Prohibitions on the Interstate
Exportation of Scarce Water Resources, Water Resources
Allocation.
Laws and Emerging Issues (1981 Conference, University
of Colorado School of Law).
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Vi'ahoo, 184 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933).
The Olson court specifically rejected the
"English rule" of rights in ground water,
which recognizes absolute ownership of
ground water in the overlying landowner.
Instead, the court adopted a slightly modi
fied version of the more restrictive Ameri
can rule of "reasonable use"; "The Ameri
can rule is that the owner of land is entitled
to appropriate subterranean waters found
under his land, but he cannot extract and
appropriate them in excess of a reasonable
and beneficial use upon the land which he
owns, especially if such use is injurious to
others who have substantial rights to the
waters, and if the natural underground sup
ply is insufficient for all owners, each is
entitled to a reasonable proportion of the
whole, and while a lesser number of states
have adopted this rule, it is, in our opinion,
supported by the better reasoning." Id. at
811, 248 N.W. at 308. The "pure" American
rule, as stated by other authorities at the
time, did not include the concept of sharing
in times of shortage, and the Olson court's
inclusion of that concept demonstrates its
view that water is a unique commodity
subject to state regulation to assure that it
is available to everyone in the state in rela
tion to their need, rather than their ability
to pay for it.
The Nebraska Constitution declares
water for irrigation purposes in the State of
Nebraska to be a natural want Neb.ConsL
Art. XV, § 4. The decades of the 1930's
and 1940's saw a quantum expansion in
Nebraska of the use of ground water for
irrigation. See Aiken, Nebraska Ground
Water Law and Administration, 59 Neb.L.
Rev. 917 (1980). Legislative recognition of
the slate's power and the corresponding
need to manage the state's ground water
resources began in 1957 when the Legisla
ture declared "that the conservation of
ground water and the beneficial use thereof
are essential to the future well-being of this
state." Neb.Rev.SUt. § 46-601 (Reissue
1978), and enacted statutes requiring well
registration, well-spacing, and filling of
abandoned wells. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 46-602
and 46-609 (Reissue 1978).
Transfer of ground water was considered
by the Legislature in 1963. Neb.Rev.Sut.
§§ 46-638 through 46-650 (Reissue 1978),
enacted that year, and § 46-654, enacted in
1965, granted only to cities, villages, and
municipal corporations the right to trans
port ground water out of its basin of origin
for the purpose of supplying urban water
needs. Since the Nebraska common law of
ground water permitted use of the water
only on the overlying land, legislative action
was necessary to allow for transfers off the
overlying land, even for as pressing a need
as supplying urban water users.
Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Merritt
Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 799-800, 140
N.W.2d 626, 636 (1966), confirmed that
"[underground waters, whether they be
percolating waters or underground streams,
are a part of the waters referred to in the
Constitution as a natural want. . . . [I]t is
becoming more important and extremely
necessary that regulation and control of all
sources of water supply be aUained." That
court held that it is "the right of the Legis
lature, unimpaired, to determine the policy
of the state as to underground waters and
the rights of persons in their use." Id. at
801, 140 N.W.2d at 637. The opinion clearly
held that the Legislature has the power to
determine public policy with regard to
ground water and that it may be transfer
red from the overlying land only with the
consent of and to the extent prescribed by
the public through its elected represenU-
tives.
Only a year after the decision in the
Metropolitan case, the Legislature enacted
the statute at issue in this case, § 46-613.01,
dealing with transfer of Nebraska ground
water across state lines. The statute allows
such transfers conditioned on the receipt of
a permit from the director of the Depart
ment of Water Resources, who may grant
the permit if the transfer "is reasonable, is
not contrary to the conservation and use of
ground water, and is not otherwise detri
mental to the public welfare," and if the
receiving state "grants reciprocal rights"
providing for transfer of ground water
from that state into Nebraska.
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[3] The parties concede that Colorado
forbids the transfer of ground water out
side its borders and has no reciprocity provi
sion in its statute. Neither the courts nor
the Legislature of Nebraska have con
sidered Nebraska ground water as an arti
cle of commerce. Free transfer and ex
change of ground water in a market setting
have never been permitted in this state,
since the water itself is publicly owned.
The public, through legislative action, may
grant to private persons the right to the use
of publicly owned waters for private pur
pose; but as the Olson opinion demon
strates, with its emphasis on sharing in
times of shortage, the public may limit or
deny the right of private parties to freely
use the water when it determines that the
welfare of the state and its citizens is at
stake. Even where it appears that water
itself is being marketed, as in municipal
water supply arrangements, it is the value
of the cost of distributing the water that is
the basis of the rate structure and not the
value of the water itself. See A'. S. B.
Tech. Sales v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977).
Appellants in their brief place great re
liance on the case of City of Altus, Oklaho
ma v. Carr, 255 F.Supp. 828 (W.D.Tex.1966),
affd per curiam 385 U.S. 35, 87 S.Ct. 240,
17 L.Ed.2d 34 (1966), which held that a
Texas statute forbidding interstate trans
fers of water without legislative permission
placed an unconstitutional burden on inter
state commerce. However, at the time of
Altus, Texas law treated ground water
much differently than Nebraska. Texas
recognized the absolute ownership of sub
terranean water in the overlying landown
er. This is in sharp contrast to the narrow
ly circumscribed right of reasonable use
only on the overlying land recognized in
Nebraska. In addition, the Altus court not
ed that, in Texas, "after the water has been
appropriated, the landowner, his lessee or
assign, has the right to sell the water to
others for use off of the land and outside
the basin where produced, just as he could
sell any other species of property." Id. 255
F.Supp. at 840. In sum, said the Altus
court, "the general law of the State of
Texas . .. recognizes water that has been
withdrawn from underground sources as
personal property subject to sale and com
merce ..." Id. at 840. Since the onlv
transfers prohibited by Texas law were in*,
terstate transfers, Altus found that Texas
considered ground water to be an article of
commerce, subject to the commands of the
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution
However, intrastate transfers of ground
water in Nebraska are permitted only un
der carefully prescribed conditions and do
not resemble a free-market setting.
Ground water use is not an unlimited pri
vate property right in Nebraska law. The
decision in Altus is not controlling. Ne
braska ground water is not an article of
commerce and thus not subject to the stric
tures of the commerce clause.
Since the Altus case was affirmed with
out opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court, we
must assume that the high court had no
quarrel with the District Court's application
of the law to the particular facts of Ahus.
However, we need not and do not assume,
as appellants would have us do, that Altus
"overruled sub sitenth" the 70-year-old
holding in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349, 28 S.Ct. 529, 52 L.Ed. 828
(1908), that a state may, under its police
power, forbid or condition the interstate
transfer of its water resources without run
ning afoul of the commerce clause. The
Hudson case upheld the constitutionality of
a New Jersey statute prohibiting the trans
fer of New Jersey surface water out of the
state. The court noted that "[a] man can
not acquire a right to property by his desire
to use it in commerce among the States,"
and emphasized that the state as "quasi
-sovereign and representative of the inter
ests of the public has a standing in court to
protect the atmosphere, the water and the
forests within its territory, irrespective of
the assent or dissent of the private owners
of the land most immediately con
cerned .... It finds itself in possession of
what all admit to be a great public good,
and what it has it may keep and give no one
a reason for its will." Id. at 355-57, 2?
S.Ct. at 531 32.
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[4] There have been other U.S. Supreme
Court caaea limiting the rights of individual
states to put conditions on the interstate
transfer of natural resources other than
water, such as natural gas and minnows.
penna v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43
S.Ct 658, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923); Oklahoma
v. Kansas Nat Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 31
S.CL 564, 55 LEd. 716 (1911); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60
L.Ed.2d 250 (1979). However, we note that
the natural resources dealt with in those
cases have historically been market items,
reducible to private possession and freely
exchangeable for value. This has never
been the case with underground water in
Nebraska. Further, since water is the only
natural resource absolutely essential to hu
man survival, the application of rules de
signed to facilitate commerce in less essen
tial resources to the transfer of water must
be done, if at all, with extreme caution. It
is this caution which prevents us from hold
ing that Nebraska ground water is an arti
cle of commerce. Because the ground
water in this case is not an article of com
merce, the commerce clause considerations
do not apply to the Nebraska statute at
issue here.
[5] Appellants also urge that § 46-613.-
01 violates the due process provisions of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, which
prohibit the United States or an individual
state from depriving an individual of life,
liberty, or property without due process of
law. Although the arguments in the "due
process" section of appellants' brief are ac
tually equal protection arguments, we note
that conditioning a landowner's right to
transfer ground water either within or
without Nebraska does not deprive him of a
property right, since, under Nebraska com
mon law, ground water may not be trans
ferred off the overlying Nebraska land at
all unless the public, owners of the water,
grant that right Not being at liberty to
transport ground water without public con
sent and having no private property right
in the water itself, appellants are deprived
of neither liberty nor property by § 46-613.-
01.
[6, 7] Nor does the reciprocity provision
of § 46-613.01 violate constitutional guar
antees of due process, as appellants claim,
by delegating legislative authority to the
legislature of another state. The Nebraska
Legislature has exercised its legislative au
thority by determining the public policy of
the state with regard to ground water and
enacting that determination into law. It
has not delegated to any other state's legis
lature the right to determine Nebraska pub
lic policy. The reciprocity provision is
merely one of several conditions to be satis
fied before a permit to transport water out
of state may be granted. As stated in
Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of
Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 590, 290 N.W. 451,
457 (1940): "The providing of such contin
gencies upon which the law might properly
be limited to take effect does not constitute
a delegation of legislative power. The ap
plicable rule is: The legislature cannot dele
gate its powers to make a law, but it can
make a law to become operative on the
happening of a certain contingency or on an
ascertainment of a fact upon which the law
intends to make its own action depend."
[8] In State v. PadJey, 195 Neb. 358, 237
N.W.2d 883 (1976), the statute at issue set a
55-mile-per-hour speed limit on the portion
of Interstate 80 crossing Nebraska, but de
clared that when the President terminates
the Emergency Highway Energy Conserva
tion Act such speed limit will revert to 75
miles per hour. The P&dley court held that:
"In so doing the Legislature has not dele
gated its power to make the law but has
designed its alternative provision to become
effective on the happening of a certain con
tingency." Id. at 360, 237 N.W.2d at 885.
That court also stated that the rule set out
in Lennox "is a well-recognized rule of
law." Id. at 360, 237 N.WJ>d at 885. The
granting of a permit to transport water for
irrigation out of state is contingent upon,
among other things, the receiving state
granting its landowners the same right.
Each state is free to determine its own
public policy with regard to ground water
transfers and to condition the right to
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transfer on one or more contingencies.
Thus, there has been no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power by the Ne
braska Legislature.
19] Appellants finally argue that § 46-
613.01 violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution by virtue of an unreasonable
classification. The class upon which § 46-
613.01 operates consists of those persons
wishing to transport Nebraska ground
water out of state for irrigation purposes.
It is plain from the language of the statute
that the classification is reasonable. It is
related to a legitimate state interest in pre
serving, for the beneficial use of its citizens,
Nebraska's underground water supply, and
it operates equally on all members of the
class. Any person wishing to transport
ground water out of state for irrigation
purposes must apply for a permit to do so
and the director of the Nebraska Depart
ment of Water Resources is to use the same
guidelines in every instance in determining
whether or not the permit may issue. That
the statute does not apply to irrigators who
do not wish to transport ground water out
of state hardly makes it violative of equal
protection.
The judgment of the District Court is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
KRIVOSHA, Chief Justice, concurring in
part, and in part dissenting.
While I generally concur with the majori
ty's conclusion that establishing legislative
criteria to control the transfer of water
from the State of Nebraska to an adjoining
state is not a violation of the commerce
clause of the U.S. Constitution, I must re
spectfully dissent from that portion of the
majority's opinion which holds that the
statutory prohibition against the issuance
of the permit, if the adjoining state does
not grant reciprocity, is a constitutionally
valid act of the Legislature. I believe thai
that portion of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 46-613.01
(Reissue 1978) which prohibits the Director
of Water Resources from issuing a permit
solely on the basis that the adjoining state
does not grant reciprocity ia an unreason
able classification and violates both the
Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Nebraska.
Were the statute in question to provide
that no person, firm, city, village, municipal
corporation, or any other entity, including a
citizen of the State of Nebraska, could use
water from this state on land owned bv
such entity in both this state and an adjoin
ing state unless and until the Director of
Water Resources found that the water re
quest was reasonable, was not contrary to
the conservation and use of ground water,
and was not otherwise detrimental to the
public welfare, I would have no difficulty
with the statute. But the statute as it
currently exists provides that even though
the director might find that the request is
reasonable and that to deny it would be
unreasonable, that the request is not con
trary to the conservation and use of ground
water in this state and, to the contrary, is in
furtherance of the conservation and use of
ground water in this state, and that it is not
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare,
but in fact is beneficial to the public wel
fare, he, nevertheless, cannot issue such
permit, solely on the basis that the adjoin
ing state does not permit entities, including
its own citizens, to transport water into this
state.
The issue here is not whether reciprocal
legislation is constitutional, but whether a
citizen of the State of Nebraska can be
prohibited from using water on land owned
by that citizen in both this state and in an
adjoining state solely on the basis that the
adjoining state would not reciprocate. If
one were to extend this statute to its logical
conclusion, one could find that even though
there was an abundance of water in an area
in Nebraska, so much so that flooding was
imminent, the water could not be transfer
red to adjoining land because the adjoining
state refused to grant reciprocity. It occurs
to me that what this statute attempts to do
is to absolutely prohibit the transfer of
water, without regard to its need or availa
bility, based solely upon the acts of another
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Joy SPORHASE et al.f Appellants.
No. 43206.
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
May 8, 1981.
Slave brought suit to enjoin defendants
from transporting Nebraska ground water
into Colorado without a permit. The Dis
trict Court, Chase County, Jack H. Hendrix,
J., issued an injunction and the defendants
appealed. The Supreme Court, White, J.,
held that: (1) commerce clause of United
States Constitution was not violated by Ne
braska statute conditioning transfer of Ne
braska ground water across state line on
receipt of permit from director of Depart
ment of Water Resources who may grant
permit if transfer is reasonable, is not con-
trary to conservation and use of ground
water and is not otherwise detrimental to
public welfare, and if receiving state grants
reciprocal rights, and (2) statutory provision
conditioning transfer of Nebraska ground
water across state line on receiving state's
granting reciprocal rights does not violate
constitutional guarantees of due process on
theory that it delegates legislative authori
ty to legislature of another state.
Affirmed.
Krivosha, C. J.t concurred in part and
dissented in part and filed opinion.
Peter E. Schoon, Jr. and George M. Zeil-
inger of Padley & Dudden, P. C, Ogallala,
for appellants.
Steven C. Smith, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., of
Van Steenberg, Brower, Chaloupka, Mullin
& Holyoke, Gering, for appellee.
Heard before KRIVOSHA, C. J., and
BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, CLINTON,
BRODKEY, WHITE, and HASTINGS. JJ.
WHITE, Justice.
Apjxjllants own adjacent tracts of land in
Chase County, Nebraska, and in Phillips
County, Colorado. A well physically loca^
ed on the Nebraska tract pumps ground
water for the purpose of irrigating crops on
both the Nebraska tract and the Colorado
tract. Defendants' predecessor in title reg.
istered the well with the State of Nebraska
on January 18, 1971, as required by Neb.
Rev.Stat. § 46-602 (Reissue 1978). How^
ever, neither the defendants nor their
predecessor in title applied to the Nebraska
Department of Water Resources for a per
mit to transport ground water from the
Nebraska well across the border into Colo-
rado as required by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 4&-
613.01 (Reissue 1978).
The State of Nebraska brought this ac
tion in the District Court of Chase County
to enjoin defendants from transporting Ne
braska ground water into Colorado without
a permit. After trial on the merits, the
District Court issued the injunction, holding
that § 46-613.01 does not violate the com
merce clause of U.S.Const. Art. I, § 8, since
under Nebraska law water is not an article
of commerce. The District Court also held
that even if ground water is an article of
commerce, the statute does not impose an
unreasonable burden of interstate com
merce. We affirm.
[1, 2] We start our analysis , with the
assumption that if the commerce clause is
to apply to a state statute regulating the
interstate transfer of a commodity, that
commodity must be an "article of com
merce." The term "commerce" implies thai
the commodity must be capable of being
reduced to private possession and then ex
changed for goods or services of the same
or similar economic value. An analysis of
Nebraska case law and statutes demon
strates that Nebraska law has never con
sidered ground water to be a market item
freely transferable for value among privau-
parties, and therefore not an article of com
merce.
The first Nebraska case to consider the
overlying landowner's proprietary interest




HUDSON COUNTY WATER COMPANY,
PJff. in Err..
v.
ROBERT H. McCARTER. .Attorney Gen
eral of the State of New Jersey.
Waters — riparian rights — diverting
water beyond state.
1. No agreement of private riparian own
ers can sanction the diversion of an im
portant stream outside the boundaries of
j the state in which it flows.
Constitutional Jaw — police power —
prohibiting diverting water beyond
state.
2. The police power of the state justifies
"ttre-^uactment of N. J. Laws 1905, chap.
23S, under which a riparian owner may be
prevented from diverting the waters of a
stream of such slate into any other state,
for use therein.
Constitutional law —due process of law
— equal protection of the laws —pro
hibiting: diverting water beyond
state.
3. Neither due process of law nor the
equal protection of the laws is denied by
N. J. Laws 1905, chap. 2.1 S. under which
a riparian owner may be prevented from
diverting the waters of a stream of the
state into any other state, for use therein.
Constitutional law — impairing con
tract obligations.
4. The obligation? of a contract to divert
the waters of the Passaic river into an
other state, for use therein, are not uncon
stitutionally impaired by the enactment,
in the exercise of the police power, of N.
J. Laws 1905. chap. 23S, under which such
a diversion of water beyond the state is
forbidden.
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for a period of more than twenty-five
years.1
In November, 1964, the City of AHus
entered into a contract with the Mocks
whereby the City of Altus was granted
an option for a period of nine months
within which to purchase a lease for pro
ducing water from subsurface water
bearing formations underlying the
Mocks' land. Then, in December, 1964,
the citizens of the City of Altus voted
to issue §2,000,000.00 in city bonds to
pay for the cost of financing the leas
ing, drilling and transportation of the
water produced from the Mocks' land.
The bonds were issued in May, 1965,
and in the same month the City of Altus
and the Mocks executed a lease whereby
the Mocks granted, demised, leased and
let unto the City of Altus the Mocks'
land for the sole and only purpose of
mining and operating for subsurface
water and for the transportation of such
water to the City of Altus for its use.
Pursuant to this lease, the City of Altus
has to date incurred expenses totaling
approximately $110,720.09 in connection
with the investigating and leasing of the
subsurface water formation underlying
the Mocks' land.
On January 26, 1965, however, Article
7477b was introduced in the House of
Representatives of the State of Texas as
House Bill No. 225 by W. S. Heatly.
Representative Heatly represents District
No. 82, which includes Wilbarger County,
Texas. The Texas Legislature passed
Article 7477b on May 28, 1965, and ad
journed on May 31, 1965. Unless called
into special session, the Texas Legislature
will not reconvene until 1967. - • •
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Commerce Clause
[15,16] By virtue of the Commerce
Clause, the Congress of these United
States was specifically granted the power
to regulate commerce among the several
states, and the states may not unreason
ably burden or interfere with interstate
commerce. This is not to say that a
state may not, in the absence of con
flicting legislation by Congress, make
laws governing matters of local concern
which may in some measure affect inter
state commerce, or even, to some extent,
regulate it. Southern Pacific Co. v. State
of Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767, 65 S.Ct.
1515, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945). Rather, it
means that a state may not enact a law
which imposes a direct burden on inter
state commerce or discriminates against
11. Stipulation of Facts, section 6, at 5.
12. Id. at 5-6.
13. Report oo Water Supply, March 19Q4,
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2, Table 7, shows
that the torn! estimated cost, including
interest oc the debt to be $3,524,000 over
a twenty-fire year amortization period.
14. The purpose of the Declaratory Judg
ment Ac:. Title 2S. f.S.C. § 2201, was
Buccintly stated in E. Edelmann & Co. v.
Triple-A Specialty Co.. SS F.2d 852, 854
CITY or ALTUB, OKLAHOMA v. CAER 837
ate o» 2S5 F.Supp. R28 (HiOO)
interstate commerce. H. P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct.
657, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949); The Minneso
ta Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 33 S.Ct. 729,
57 L.Ed. 1511 (1913). In the recent case
of Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444,80 S.Ct. 813,
4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960), an undue or un
reasonable burden was defined as one
which materially affects interstate com
merce where uniformity of regulation is
necessary.
The Plaintiffs contend that Section 2
of Article 7477b constitutes an unreason
able burden upon interstate commerce
for the reason that it permits the with
drawal and use of underground water
subject to the one and only condition that
such water shall not be transported to
another state. In support thereof, the
Plaintiffs rely upon the cases of Com
monwealth of Pennsylvania v. State of
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658
(1923) and West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229, 31 S.Ct. 564, 55 L.Ed.
716 (1910).
In the case of Commonwealth of Penn
sylvania v. State of West Virginia the
Supreme Court had before it the question
whether a State wherein natural gas is
produced and is a recognized subject of
commercial dealings may enact a statute
which requires that the consumers of
such State shall be accorded a preferred
right of purchase over consumers in other
States. In holding the statute in ques
tion an interference with interstate com
merce, the Supreme Court stated:
"The question is an important one;
for what one state may do others may,
and there are 10 states from which nat-
(7th Cir. 3937): "It -was the conpres-
sionnl intent to avoid accrual of avoidable
damnfres to one not certain of his rights
and to afford him an early adjudication
■without waiting until his adversary should
Bee fit to begin suit, after damage had
accrued." Accord: Luekenbach S. S. Co.
v. Tniied States. 312 F.2rt 545 (2d Cir.
3D(k>>; Muskogon Piston I»ing Co. v. 01-
Fen. 307 F.2d 85 (6tb Cir. 19G2), cert,
denied 371 T.S. 952. S3 S.Ct. 50S. 9 L.
Ed.2d 500: Shell Oil Co. v. Fruserta, 280
F.2d GS9 (9th Cir. 2961).
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Commerce — state Interference — j>ro-
lilMtlng diverting WMler l«\\ond
FtlllC.
5. Commerce between the stales of New
York and New Jersey is not unlawfully in
terfered with by N* J. Lnws ]i»05, chap.
238, under which a riparian owner nun-
be forbidden to divert the waters of tin*
Passaic river beyond the state, under a
contract to furnish a water supply for the
city of New York.
Constitutional luw — privileges and im-
xnnnilics — forbidding diverting wu-
ter beyond slate.
C. Privileges of citizens of New Jersey
are not denied to the citizens of other stale*
by N. J. Laws 1905, chap. 23S. under which
a* riparian owner may be prevented from
di\ erring the waters of a stream of that
6tate into any other Btate, for use therein.
[No. 184.]
Argued March 18, 19, 1908. Decided April
6, 1908.
IN TT.TiOR to the Court of Errors and
Appeals of the State of New Jersey to
review a decree which affirmed a decree of
the Court of Chancery of that state, en
joining the diversion of the water of the
Pa<=<=ak- river under a contract to furni«h
a water surply for the city of New York.
Affirmed.
See saroe case below. 70 N. J. Eq. 695,
G5 Ail. 4F9.
The fact? are stated in the opinion.
M<?8srs. Gilbert Collins and Richard V.
Lindnlmry for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Robert H. MeCarier for defendant
in error.
Mr. Justice Holmes: delivered the opin
ion of the court:
This is an information alleging that the
defendant (the plaintiff in error"i. under a
contract with the city of Bayonne. in New
Jersey, has laid mains in that city for the
purpose of carrying water to Staten island.
in the state of New York. By other con
tracts it is to pet the water from the Pas-
saie river, at Little Falls, where the East
Jersey Water Company has a large plant
by which the water is withdrawn. On Mny
11, 1W5. the state of New Jersey, reciting
the need of preserving the fresh water of
. f tbe state for the health and prosperity of
thf citizens, enacted that "it shall be un
lawful for any person or corporation to
transport or carry, through pinos. conduits,
di:c!ir:>. or canals, tbe waters of any fresh
w.itcr lake. ]«oiid. brook, creek, river, or
strram of tVi? «-;au- into any oilier =tnte.
for u?e tilt-rein.'* By a second srction a
proo*"iiinc like the present was authorized.
in order to enforce tbe act. Laws of IOC'S.
chap. '23b. p. 4GJ. After the pansage of this
Ptatuti- the defendant made a contract with
tbe city of New York to furnish a supply
of water adequate for the boroush of Rich
mond, and of not leas than 2,000,000 gal
lons u day. Thereupon this information waa
brought, praying that, pursuant to tbe
abo\e act and otherwise, the defendant
might be enjoined from carrying the waters
of the Passaic river out of the ptatt. There
arc allegations as to the amount of water
and the probable future demand, upon which
the parties arc not wholly agreed, hut the
essential facts are not denied. The defend
ant sets up that the statute, if applicable
to it, is contrary to the Constitution of the
Vnited States, that it impairs the obliga
tion of contracts, takes property without
due process of Jaw, interferes with com
merce between New Jersey and New York,
denies the privileges of citizens of New Jer
sey to citizens of other states, and denies to
them the equal protection of the laws. An
injunction was issued by the chancellor ("0
N. J. Eq. 525. Cl All. 710), tbe decree was
affirmed by the court oj errors and appeals
(70 N. J.' Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 489), and the
ca<-e then was brought here.
The courts below assumed or decided, and
we shall assume, that the defendant repre
sents the rights of a riparian proprietor:
and. on the other band, that it represents
no special chartered powers that give it
greater rightB than those. On these as
sumptions the court of errors and appeal*
pointed out that a riparian proprietor has
no right to divert waters for more than a
reasonable distance from the body of the
stream or for other than the well-known
ordinary uses, and that for any pur
pose anywhere he is narrowly limited in
amnmt. It went on to infer that his only
ri'-'i.: in the body of the strtam is to have
! the flow continue, and that thf-re i? a resid-
] uum of public ownership in the state. It
'. reinforced the state's right? by the state?
: title to the bed of the stream where flowed
by the tide, and concluded from the fore
going and other considerations that, as
against the rights of riparian owners merely
as such, the state was warranted in pro
hibiting the acquisition of the title to water
on a larger scale.
We will not say that the considerations
that we have stated do not warrant the
conclusion reached; and we shall not at
tempt to revise the opinion of the local
court upon the local law. if. for the purpose
of drei-ion. we accept the argument of the
plain*if in error that it is o>t. to revision
I when eon«".iiutional right* are set up. Nei-
I ihi-r shall we consider whether such a *'»ai-
! me as the one before us might not be up-
' held, even if the lower riparian proprietors
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were the absolute owii'-t* of (If
efn-aiii, on tin* ground thnt jl nutiiori/.i-d n
suit by the plate in their infereM, wIitc it
dora not appear Dial ihey all hnv<« rele;jM-<l
tiioir rights. Sec Kansas v. Colorado, )B5
U. 8. 125. 142, 4G L. ed. 836, S44, 22 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 552. But we pref.-r to put the
authority, which cannot !><■ denied to the
state, upon a broader ground than that
which was emphasized helnw. Bince, in our
opinion, it is jiid«-K'rHi-nt of tin- more or
Jess attenuated residuum of title that the
etatt may be eaid to pus-ess.
All rights tend to declare themselves ab
solute to their logical extreme. Yet all in
fact arc limited by tin- neighborhood of
principles of policy which ar* oilier than
those on which the particular right is found
ed, and which become- strong enough to hold
their own when a certain point is reached.
Tin* limits set to property by other public
interests present themselves as a branch of
■what is called the police power of the state.
The boundary at which the conf.icting inter
ests balance cannot be determined by any
gc-nc-ral formula in advance, but points in
the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed
by decisions that this or that concrete case
falls on the nearer or farther side. For in
stance, tlie police power mar limit the
height of buildings in a city, without com
pensation. To that extent it cuts down
what otherwise would be the rights of prop-
eny. But if it should attempt to limit the
height so far as to make an ordinary build
ing lot wholly useless, the rights of prop
erty would prevail over the other public
interest, and the police power would fail.
To set such a limit would need compensa
tion and the power of eminent d'main.
/ It sometimes is difficult to fix boundary
stones between the private right of property
and the police power when, as in the case
at bar, we know of few decisions that are
very much in point. But it is recognized
that the state, as quasi-sovereign and repre
sentative of the interests of the public, has
a standing in court to protect the atmos
phere, the water, and the forests within its
territory, irrespective of the a^ent or dis
sent of the private owners of the land most
immediately concerned. Kansas r. Colora
do, 185 U.'S. 125, 141, 142. 46 L. ed. 83S,
844. 645, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552, s. C. 20C
TJ. S. 40. 0?. 51 L. ed. P50, 975, 27 Sup. Ct.
Rez>. C55; Georeia v. Tennessee Copper Co.
20ii U. S. 230. 23S. 51 L. ed. 103S. 1044. 27
Sup. Ct. T.ep. CIS. What it may protect
by suit in this court from interference in
the name of property outside of tue state's
jurisdiction, one would think thnt it could
protect by statute from interferenre in the
same name within. On this principle of
public interest and the pel ice power, and not
nn-ri ly as the inheritor of a royal preroga-
tivf, thr Rlnt«- may make law* for the pres
ervation of ptnii*. which ncrm u stronger
cane. Goer v. Cnuwrtirut, Kil U. S. 51B,
M4, 40 L. cd. 793. 7(»B. Ifi Sup. Ct. Rep.
COO.
T\\<: problems of irrigation have no place
here. Jiving them on one sM<. it ajijwara
to us that few public interest * are more
obvious, indisputable, and independent of
particular theory than the intcr'.-st of the
public of a 9tote to maintain the rivers
that are wholly within it substantially un-
diminished, except by such draft- u»»on them
as the guardian of the public welfare may
permit for the purjiose of turning them to a •
more perfect use. This public interest is
omnipresent wherever there is a state, and
grows more pressing as population grows.
It is fundamental, and we are of opinion
that the private property of riparian pro
prietors cannot be supposed to have deeper
roots. Whether it be said that such an in
terest justifies the cutting down by statute,
without compensation, in the exercise of the
j.olice power, of what otherwise would be
private rights of property, or that, apart
from statute, those rights do not go to the
height of what the defendant seeks to do,
the result is the same.- But we agree with
the Xew Jersey courts, and think it quite
beyond any rational view of riparian rights,
that an agreement, of no matter what pri
vate owners, could sanction the diversion
of an important stream outside the bound
aries of the state in which it flowB. The
private right to appropriate is subject not
only to the rights of lower owners, but to
the initial limitation that it may not sub
stantially diminish one of the great foun
dations of public welfare and health.
We are of opinion, further, that the con
stitutional power of the state to insist taat
its natural advantages shall remain unim
paired by its citizens is not dependent upon
any nice estimate of the extent of present
use or speculation as to future needs. The
legal conception of the necessary is apt to
be confined to somewhat rudimentary wants,
and there are benefits from a great river
that might escape a lawyer's view. But
the state is not required to submit even to
an aesthetic analysis. Any analysis may be
inadequate. It fiuds itself in possession of
what all admit to be a great public good,
and what it has it may keep and give no
one a reason for its will. ■ " -
The defense under the I4th Amendment
is disposed of by what we have said. That
under article 1, § 10, needs but a few words
more. One whose rights, such as they are,*
are subject to stale restriction, cannot re
move them from the power of the state by
making a contract about then:. Tin- con-
8\
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tract will carry with it the infirmity of the
•ulijcftmattrr. Kno\vill» Wnicr Co. v.
Kiioxvillt, 180 U. S- 43-J, 438, 47 L. ed.
8S7. 892, 23 Suy.. Cl. TW> 531 ; Manipault
v. Spring, ]'Jfl U. S. 473, 480, SO L. ed. 274,
278. 2G Sup. Ct. Rep. 127. But the con-
tiar-i, the- execution of which h nought to be
prevented here, was illegal when it was
The other defenses also may receive short
answers. A man cannot acquire a ripht to
property by his desire to use it in commerce
amonp the states. Neither can he enlarge
bis otherwise limited and qualified ripht to
the same end. The case is covered in this
resjiect by Geer t. Connecticut, 1C1 U. S.
519, 40 L. ed. 793, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 000.
and the same decision disposes of the argu
ment that the New Jersey law denies equal
privileges to the citizens of New York./ It
constantly is necessary to reconcile and to
adjust different constitutional principles,
each of which would be entitled to posses
sion of the disputed ground but for the
presence of the others. a= we already have
said that it is necessary to reconcile and to
c(.";u^t diCereu: }Tiri'ip!>- of the common law.,
s..<- Asi.«-ii v. k«!j<i- :j'«r» i". s. lir.i. ra l.
'•J. —. 2S Sup. Ci. ll-;-. JS."l.v Tin- rigL: to
receive water from a river through pipes is
subject to territorial limit; by nature, and
those limits may be fixed by the siaie with-
in which the river flows, even if they are
made to coincide with the state line..' With
in the boundary, citizens of New York are
as free to purchase- as citizens of New- Jer
sey. But this question does not concern the
defendant, which is a New Jersey corpora
tion. There is nothing else that needs men
tion. We are of opinion that the decision
of the Court of Errors and Appeals was
rijrht.
Dt-cret affirmed.
Mr. Justice McKenna dissents.
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of the United States, tbe Supreme Court hop
jurisdiction of an appeal from tbe decree, un
der Judicial Code, § 128 (Comp. St. £ 3120),
thoupb tbe Circuit Court of Appeals did sot
base itB decree on tbe constitutional ricbt
claimed, unless the claim was so unsubstantial
as to be frivolous.
2. Courts C=s382(5)—Decision of right to use
of interstate stream held based on constitu
tional grounds.
Where tbe defendant in a suit to reptrain
a Ftnte ojjgiuevr from depriving plaintiff of
its ripbt to take waters diverted within tbe
state across the state boundary, claimed tbt
ripbt to prevent such takiig on tbe prouud tbe
rifht to tbe water within tbe state was vested
in the people of tbe slate under tbe state Con
stitution, which claim was denied by tbe lower
fourts. the decision was not based on tbe laws
of either state, but on rights in tbe interstate
stream secured by the Constitution of tbe Unit
ed States, bo thai an appeal lies to tbe Supreme
Court under Judicial Code, § 12S (Comp. St.
8 1120).
Appeal from tbe United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for tbe Eighth Circuit.
Suit by tbe Pioneer Irrigation Company
.'ic.iir.st A<!ell*rt A. Weiland. as State Engi-
ut-er of tlip State of Colorado, and others.
1 iferee for tbe plaintiff was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals (151 C. C. A. 4"m.
-?>b Fi-d. ,p»19i. and defendant;? appeal. M«-
tion to dismiss tbe appeal denied, and de-
crt-e affirmed.
| •Messrs. Delph E. Carpenter, of Greeley.
| Colo., and Victor E. Keyes, Fred Farrar, and
, Leslie E. Hubbard, all of Denver. Colo., for
ap) teHants.
Mr. Edwin H. Park, of Denver, Colo., for
appellee.
Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opin
ion of the Court.
The appellants, defendants below, are citi
zens and offk-ers of tbe state of Colorado,
charged vritb official duties wiib resi>ect to
tbe distribution of water from streams of
that state for irrigating purposes, and other
citizens of Colorado, who need not be further
noiiced.
The appellee, plaintiff below, a corporation
organized uiicer Nebraska laws, is the owner
of an irrijr.iting canal b7 which it has di
verted water from the North fork of the
Republican river, an interstate stream, at n
point about G miles west of tbe east line of
■ 2f* r. S. «si Cojorado. Since lSf«O one-third of the water
WEILAND. State^Eisjjineer^of Colorado, et ai. Ilius obtained has l*ea sold Hud used on
Inud* in Colorado, mid the rcmaininp two-
tliirds carried by the canal into Nebraska
has been used on lanes in that suite.
This suit was comirenced in 391o, in the
District Court of the United States for the
District of Colorado. Tbe bill of complaint
is not printed in full in the record, but tbe
cj-iii'jne of it shows that, iu addition to di-
vorsiry of citizenship :is a basis of .iurisdk*-
v. PIONEER IRR. CO.
(Re argued Jututry 30. 11. V.<22. Decided
No. 3.
I. Courts C=>382(5)—Federal question in bill
gives jurisdiction on appeal, unless it is
frivolous.
Where tbe bil] sufficiently sets up a ques
tion arifinr under the -Coiisiituiion and laws'
^V
OLLer case? spe lojuc aud KEV-NCMBEr. Id all Key.Numbered Digesu and lDdeies
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tlon. !l was averred that th-- rich! of npj<ellce,
tinder the Constitution of 1ho Unifed States
to on-vise in commerce between the states of
Colorado and Nebraska, hy trauKjiortiJijr
wuter from the former inio tin- latter und
then- soiling it for uprk-nlturnl and domestic
purjKisc-E. was being seriously impaired by
the unconstitutional conduct of the state of-
ficialF of-Colorado, *in permitting, under color
of the laws of that state, the wasteful «<••- pf
the water hy appropriators prior in risht,
and the use hy other? subsequent in right, to
a valid appropriation by the appellee. There
■was also a general allegation that rirhts of
a pi-el lee secured to it by the Constitution
and laws of the United Slates had been in
vaded by tbe action of tbe appellant officials.
A decree permanently enjoining this alleged
unconstitutional action by the state officers
was prayed for.
In its decree tbe District Court found that
there existed tbe requisite diversity of citi-
7-enshjp to give the court jurisdiction, and
also that the "suit was brought to obtain
redress for the deprivation by defendants
[appellants] of rights and privileges secured
zonsliJp. nevertheless both the district C"urt
and the Circuit Courl of Appeals sustained
apTHlfp'p ijF<- and disposition of the writer
in Nebraska as one morely of prescriptive
richt. derived from 20 yars of undisputed
use. and not ujron nny federal constitutional
ground, aud that therefore the jurisdiction
exercised rested wholly upon diversity of
ip. aud »u appeal doe= not lie from
the decision of tbe Circuit Court of Appenls
uuder section 12S of the Judicial Code (Com-p.
.St. f l]20).
The {rround of federal juried?ction. other
than diversity of citizenship, being sufficient
ly set up in the bill, pucb a motion to dis
miss can prevail only if thv claim is so un
substantial as to be frivolous. Shulthis v.
McDougnl. 225 U. S. PCI, Z'J Sup. Ct. 704, 50
L. Ed. 1205: I^vell. Trusiee v. Newman &
Son. 227 U. S. 412. 120. SO Sup. Ct. 375. 57
L. Ed. 577. But such clearly was not tbe
fact in this case,
[2] It is entirely clear that tbe essential
and substanti.il issue in tbe c^se arose from
the insertion by the sp:-eliee of the federal
constitutional rijrht to transport water, deriv-
to the plaintiff [appellee] bv the Constitution ^d *rom an interstate stream, from Colorado
and laws of the United Zx&us.» and that, 3nto ***«iska under its pnonry of apprc-
therefore it was a suit arisiujj under the I1."?00" as of 1S'90- arjd tbe d'JDial of th]"
laws of the United States. The court found claim b-T the aPPe"ant state olhcers, based
that the carrying capacitv of appellees diich j urx)n tLe conteDtion that water in natural
at the Nebraska state line was -9 cubic fe?t! U){emate breams in Coloraau. having been
of water per second, that since the date of ^clnred by tbe Constitution and laws of
tbe construction of tbe ditch in 1890 that *h« state t0 be ^ Property of tbe public,
amount of water had been put to beneficial j dedicated to the use of tbe peo^e of Colora-
use in the irrigation of kinds within the state : do> the n?ht could DOt be obtained by ap-
nf Nebraska, and that by reason of such con- proi,riat5oD a]cd 'f
xuiued beneficial use there hnd 1-ecome vested
3d the appellee a property right to tbe con
tinued use thereof. The Colorado officials,
and their successors in office were enjoined
•'from interfering with the right of plaintiff
fappeltee) to eaid water as herein adjudged
and • • • from treating plaintiff in the
distribution of water • * • otherwise than
it would be treated if said canal were whol
ly within the siate of Colorado and all lands
irrigated therefrom were in said state.."
The court declined to consiuer the question
of the wasteful or other use of the water by
<>:licr ajipropriators in Colorado, and. confin
ing its decree to tbe one point dealt with in




tuse, to carry such
water into an adjoining state for like use.
as against persons desiring to use it in Colo
rado, even though junior in point of date of
appropriation. Both lower courts denied this
contention of the state officials, appellants,
and enjoined them- from treating the appellee
in the distribution of water otherwise than
as if the state line had not existed, and the
! land irrigated had been wholly within tbe
state of Colorado. It is thu? plain that tbe
decree appealed front- necessarily rested, not
upon Colorado laws or decisions which at
tempted to deny the asserted right to the
use of tbe water in Nebraska, nor upon
Nebraska laws or decisions which could not
be effective in Colorado, but upon rights se
cured to the appellee by tbe Constitution
of the United States. This substantial and
very fundamental question being in tbe case.
which was
proceeding all other issues joined under the
plea dings. ,
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the aud e?sential to tbe
decree of the District Court, and on the con-; made of it, the motion to dismiss must be
testion that a constitutional question is in-■ overruled,
velved the case is brought here for review. As to the merits of the case: In the dis-
The appellee filed n motion in this court i cussion of the .iurisdictioual question ir has
to dismiss or afiiria. which was passed to ' been sufficiently develoj>ed tbr.t ih-r essential
hearing on the merits. j controversy here involved is whether priority
11 j In supjtort of the'motion to dismiss it' of appropriation of water, from the part of
is argued that, although jurisdiction was in- j an interstate stream in Colorado, for bene-
vnked in tbe bill on sufb-.ie:i:Jy ^lVst'il led- ! noinl use on lands in Nebraska, into whicL
er:;l grounds, in :ii2'Ji;u>i> to diversity of citi-j state Uie sire.inr in a siate of ua:ure n\nv&.
K-25
r,70 42 si:ri:i:Mn coujjt w:i*oirn:it <oct. Term,
Biiprrinrlij- of rlslit over Infer appro
priation nlso inude in Colorudo from tbe
sumo stream, but for use Id that Rtate.
Both of the lower courts bold that the
presence of the- state line did not affect tbe
superiority <if ri^ht nnd enjoined the Colo
rado rtflte officials from treating the aiij»fllce
in the distribution of wnter otherwise thnn
it would lit* trcjited if tbp <'nunl were wholly |
within the stnte of Colorado nnd all the*!
liinds irripnti'd therefrom were in that sttite.
The question thu.« presented is bo fully diP-|
loosed of ou principle and authority in the |
opinion of the court this day announced in i
No. ii orisinssl, State of Wyoming v. Slate
•r»n:t
of Colorado et al., "259 L*. S. ^1^. i'J Sup. Ct.
Ji52. CC L. Ed. . that further discussion of
it would be superfluous, and upon the au
thority of that decision tbe decree of tbe
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closed that he had actually been advised
in these matters by witness, Edward
Dunn, the Congregational Servant. Mr.
Dunn was recognized by the Draft Board
as an ordained minister and presiding
clergyman of Jehovah's Witnesses in that
area. Clearly, defendant's contention has
no merit.
[4] Finally, defendant urges that the
Court erred in not dismissing for cause
a prospective juror (stricken by defend
ant), who admitted that he was preju
diced against Jehovah's Witnesses. This
juror was one of four, from which group
two alternates were to be chosen. The
case was a short case and the likelihood
of need of any alternates was slight. No
alternate was needed. The original jury
already picked decided the case. The
contention is likewise without merit.
O ! Ml KUMBIR itJHM>
CITY OF ALTUS, OKLAHOMA, et al.
v.
Wagoner CARR.
Civ. A. No. 1580.




Suit by Oklahoma municipality and
others for declaration that a Texas stat
ute violated the Federal Constitution.
The three-judge District Court, Suttle,
District Judge, held that Texas statute
prohibiting, without legislative permis
sion, the removal of water from under
ground source in Texas for use in another
state constitutes an unconstitutional bur
den upon interstate commerce.
Belief prayed for granted and judg
ment accordingly.
1. Courts C=>260.4
Generally federal courts will abstain
from exercising jurisdiction in case
where state statute is under attack as be
ing violative of United States Constitu
tion until such state statute has been first
construed by courts of that state.
2. Courts O=>260.4
The doctrine of abstention is not an
absolute rule to be applied by federal
courts to all cases involving constitution
ality of a state statute which has not
been construed by the state court.
3. Courts 0=260.4
If a state statute is not fairly sub
ject to an interpretation which will avoid
or modify federal constitutional question,
the federal court has a duty to decide the
federal question when presented to it re
gardless of whether state court has con
strued the statute.
4. Waters and Water Courses C=131
Under Texas law, landowner has
right to drill wells and appropriate water
beneath his land.
5. Courts 0=260.4
Texas statute forbidding, without
legislative permission, the withdrawing
of water from an underground source in
state for use outside state was clear and
unambiguous in meaning, and since under
no reasonable construction could the con
stitutional issue be avoided federal court
would not abstain from exercising juris
diction in action to declare statute vio
lative of Federal Constitution even
though Texas court had not construed it.
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art. 7477b, § 2.
6. Courts 0=260.4
Where remedy of landowner under
statute prohibiting the withdrawing of
water, without legislative permission,
from an underground source in Texas for
use outside state was in the nature of a
political or special legislative remedy
rather than administrative or judicial
remedy, landowners would not be re
quired to exhaust such remedy before
federal court would exercise jurisdiction
in action to declare statute violative of
Federal Constitution.
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7. Courts O262.4 (2)
Individuals who, as officers of the
state, are clothed with some duty in re
gard to enforcement of laws of state, and
who threaten and are about to commence
proceedings, either of a civil or criminal
nature, to enforce against parties affect
ed an act violating Federal Constitution
may be enjoined by federal court from
such action. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 11.'
8. Courts €=303(8)
The fact that a state officer by vir
tue of his office has some connection
with enforcement of the allegedly uncon
stitutional act is the important and ma
terial fact in determining whether suit
to declare act unconstitutional and nam
ing officer is prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
and whether officer's connection arises
out of general law, or is specially created
by the act itself, is not material so long
as it exists.
9. Courts C=303(8)
Texas Attorney General, who was by
virtue of statute specifically granted au
thority to prosecute suits to enforce pro
visions of particular chapter of which
allegedly unconstitutional statute was a
part, had some connection with enforce
ment of statute so that federal court by
taking jurisdiction of suit to declare act
unconstitutional and naming him as a
party was not violative of the Eleventh
Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 11.
10. Declarators' Judgment C=123
There must be a realistic fear of
prosecution or a realistic fear or appre
hension that state statute in question will
be enforced against plaintiffs if federal
court action to declare state statute vio
lative of Federal Constitution is not to
be deemed premature.
11. Declarators' Judgment C=124
Oklahoma municipality and Texas
landowner bringing suit for declaration
of unconstitutionally of Texas statute
prohibiting, without legislative permis
sion, taking of water from underground
source in Texas for use in another stale
had a realistic fear or apprehension that
statute would be enforced against them
OITY OF ALTUS, OKLAHOMA v. OARR g29
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and their suit for declaration of uncon
stitutionally of statute was not prema
ture. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art.
7477b, § 2; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 11.
12. Courts 0=303(8)
It is not necessary that state offi
cer, upon whom is duty of enforcing par
ticular state statute attacked as violative
of Federal Constitution, take some af
firmative action to enforce statute so that
suit against state officer in federal court
to declare state statute unconstitutional
be without the Eleventh Amendment, and
if officer can, by declining to act, enforce
statute there is threat enough to take suit
without provisions of the Eleventh
Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 11.
13. Courts C=303(8)
Where the very presence of Texas
statute prohibiting the taking of water
from underground souree in Texas for
use elsewhere and the possibility of its
enforcement would preclude Oklahoma
municipality from making further sub
stantial expenditures of tax money nec
essary to obtain and transport water
from Texas land, the presence of statute
and the failure of Texas Attorney Gen
eral to act constituted sufficient threat
to take case against Attorney General in
federal court to declare statute unconsti
tutional without contemplation of
Eleventh Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 11.
14. Declarator}' Judgment C=24
Purpose of Declaratory Judgment
Act is to avoid accrual of unavoidable
damages to one not certain of his rights
and to afford him an early adjudication
without waiting until his adversary
should see fit to make suit, after damage
had occurred. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201.
25. Commerce C=5, 48
By virtue of Commerce Clause, Con
gress was specifically granted power to
regulate commerce among the several
states, and the states may not unreason
ably burden or interfere with interstate
commerce. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 3.
K-28
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J6. Commerce C=48
State may, in absence of conflicting
legislation by Congress, make laws gov
erning matters of local concern which
may in some measure affect interstate
commerce, or even, to some extent, regu
late it, but a state may not enact the law
which imposes a direct burden on inter
state commerce or discriminates against
interstate commerce. U.S.C.A.Const. art.
1, § 8, cl. 3.
17. Commerce C=48
The legislative declaration as to pur
pose and intent of statute prohibiting the
removal of water from underground
source in Texas for use outside of state
to conserve and protect all water resourc
es both public and private did not bind
Texas landowner and Oklahoma munici
pality seeking declaration that statute
was unconstitutional, and they could show
that statute in its practical operation was
an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3; Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art. 7477b,
§2.
18. Commerce O=55
Texas statute prohibiting, without
legislative permission, the removal of wa-
ler from underground source in Texas for
use in another state constitutes an un
constitutional burden upon interstate
commerce. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1. § 8. cl.
3; Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art. 7477b,
§2.
19. Waters and Water Courses C=1O5
Under Texas law, if a landowner
drilling well on his own land intercepts
or drains off water from beneath his
neighbor's land, this inconvenience to his
neighbor falls within description of dam-
num absque injuria and carinot be ground
of an action.
20. Waters and Water Courses C=154(1)
The right to enter upon land and ap
propriate underground percolating wa
ters is an interest in real estate which
may be exercised by Texas landowner or
I. Sec. 2 of H.B. No. 225. Tex.Acts 1965,
.r.f»;L Lep.. ch. T>6> at 124?>. efrVcrivr Aug.
made the subject of an independent grant
of ownership.
21. Waters and Water Courses <3=154(1)
After underground percolating water
has been appropriated, landowner, hig
tenant or assign, has right to Bell water
to others for use off land and outside
basin where produced, just as he could
sell any other species of property. Ver
non's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. arts. 7477b, § 7,
7880-3c, subd. D.
A. W. Walker, Jr., Ben B. West, Dallas,
Tex., James W. Wilson, McGinnis, Loch-
ridge, Kilgore, Hunter &. Wilson, Austin,
Tex., for plaintiffs.
Hawthorne Phillips, First Asst. Atty.
Gen., J. Arthur Sandlin, Roger Tyler,
Asst. Attys. Gen., of Texas, Austin, Tex.,
for defendant.
Before THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
SPEARS, Chief Judge, District Court,
and SUTTLE, District Judge.
SUTTLE, District Judge.
This is a suit for declaratory judgment
decreeing that Section 2 of Article 7477b.
Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St&ts.1 is unconsti
tutional and void as being in violation
of the Commerce Clause - of the "United
States Constitution, and for permaneni
injunction restraining the enforcemer.t
or execution thereof against these plain
tiffs.
Section 2 of Article 7477b, Vernor.'.-
Ann.Tex.Civ.Stats. (Supp.1965) reads:
"No one shall withdraw water from
any underground source in this State
for use in any other state by drilUnp
a well in Texas and transporting the
water outside the boundaries of the
State unless the same be specifically
authorized by an Act of the Texaf
Legislature and thereafter as approved
by it."
After a careful consideration of th?
record, briefs and arguments of
2. Article 1. Section 8, Clause 3.
Suites Constitution.
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we are of the opinion the plaintiffs are
entitled to the relief prayed for.
Summary of Stipulated Facts
The Plaintiff, City of Altus, Oklahoma,
js a municipal corporation and county
seat of Jackson County, Oklahoma, and
plaintiffs, C. F. Mock and Pauline Mock,
are husband and wife and reside in the
City of Altus, Oklahoma. The Defendant
"Waggoner Carr is the Attorney General
of the State of Texas.
The Plaintiff, City of Altus, has an
annual water allotment of 4,800 acre feet,
set in 1941. from the W. C. Austin Proj
ect of the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation.
In recent years, due to a rapid growth in
population,3 there has been an increased
demand upon the available water supply,
which cannot be increased as all available
water drawn from the Project over and
above the allotment is committed to other
users. In 1963, the City of Altus used
its entire water allotment, and in 1964
was required to borrow some 700 acre
feet, of its 1965 allotment.
In December, 1963, foreseeing the
problem of water shortage, the City of
Altus retained an engineering firm to
make recommendation? as to potential
sources of water that might be economi
cally developed so as to meet its future
requirements. In its March. 1964, Report,
on Water Supply,4 the engineering firm
recommended that the City of Altus ac
quire from C. F. Mock and his wife,
Pauline, the subsurface water rights in
and to land owned by them in northern
Wilbarger County. Texas, noting in such
report that the Attorney General of the
State of Texas in December. 1963. ren
dered an opinion that it would be legal
for a Texas property owner to sell water
from his land to an Oklahoma user.5
3. T)m> population of the City of AJtus has
increnBed from 9,735 in 1959 to en esti
mated 23,500 at the present. Excludinp
Alrus Air Force Base, which from 1900
through 1903 had a constant resident
population of 5.59? persons, the City
of Altus has had an average annual in
crease in population of 5S9 persons from
1H")O to 3900. Report on Water Sup-
831
The Mocks' land, approximately 6,663
contiguous acres, lying in northern Wil
barger County, Texas, borders the Red
River, the boundary line between Wil
barger County, Texas, and Jackson Coun
ty, Oklahoma, and is some fourteen miles
from the City of Altus, Oklahoma. Ap
proximately six square miles of the
Mocks' land is located in the extreme
northern portion of an area covering ap
proximately 75 square miles known as
the Odell Sand Hills, under which there
is a natural subsurface water-bearing
formation which contains a high quality
percolating ground water suitable for mu
nicipal use. The City of Vernon, Texas,
some 14 miles south of the Mocks' land,
has several wells drawing from this for
mation, the northern-most well being
some four miles south of the southern
boundary of the Mock property. With
the exception of the Odell Sand Hills,
there is no economically available ground
water within a 50-mile radius of either
the City of Altus or the City of Vernon
which is of such quality and quantity.
With the permission of the Mocks, and
at the request of the City of Altus, a wa
ter-well drilling and engineering firm
drilled and logged a series of 26 test
hole? on the Mock land during the month
of July, 1964, for the purpose of testing
the quantity and quality of the subsur
face water and determining the cost of
its production. In its report of Septem
ber, 1964,6 the drilling and engineering
firm recommended that the City of Altus
develop two well fields by drilling 13
wells at suggested sites which would have
an estimated yearly yield of approximate
ly 2100 acre feet. This combined with
the annual allotment from the W. C. Aus
tin Project is estimated to be sufficient
to serve the needs of the City of Altus
ply. March 39SJ, pps. 5-8. Plaintiffs' Ex
hibit No. 2.
4. Report on Water Supply, suprn note 3.
5. Attorney General"? Opinion C-399, Dec.
20. 39G3.
6. Ground Water Survey for City of Altus.
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ural gas is exported for consumption
in other states. Besides, what may
be done with one natural product may
be done with others, and there are
several states in which the earth yields
products of great vaiue which are car
ried into other Btates and there used.
But, notwithstanding the importance
of the question, its solution is not dif
ficult. The controlling principles have
been settled by many adjudications—
some so closely in point that the dis
cussion here may be relatively brief.
"By the Constitution (article I, § 8,
cl. 3) the power to regulate interstate
commerce is expressly committed to
Congress and therefore impliedly for
bidden to the states. The purpose in
this is to proiect commercial inter
course from invidious restraints, to
prevent interference through conflict
ing or hostile state laws and to insure
uniformity in regulation. It means
that in the matter of interstate com
merce we are a single nation—one and
the same people. All the states have
assented to it, all are alike bound by
it. and all are equally protected by it.
Even their power to lay and collect
taxes, comprehensive and necessary as
that power is, cannot be exerted in a
way which involves a discrimination
against such commerce. (citations
omitted)
"Natural gas is a lawful article of
commerce, and its transmission from
one state to another for sale and con
sumption in the latter is interstate
commerce. A state law, whether of the
state where the g2s is produced or that
where it is sold, which by its necessary
operation prevents, obstructs or bur
dens such transmission is a regulation
of interstate commerce—a prohibited
interference." 262 L\S. at 596, 43
S.Ct at 6d5 (citations omitted)
In "West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
the Supreme Court had before it an Okla
homa statute which denied the right of
eminent domain and the right to use the
highways of the state for the purpose of
transporting natural gas without the
state. The effect of the statute was to
deny owners of the natural gas the right
to transport it out of the state. The Su
preme Court, in holding the statute in.
valid under the Commerce Clause, stated:
"We place our decision on the char
acter and purpose of the Oklahoma
statute. * * * It denies to appel
lees the lesser right to pass under
* * * or over [the highways] * *.
This discrimination is beyond the pow
er of the state to make. As said by
the circuit court of appeals in the
eighth circuit, no state can by action
or inaction prevent, unreasonably bur
den, discriminate against or directly
regulate, interstate commerce or the
right to carry it on. And in all of
these inhibited particulars the statute
of Oklahoma offends." 221 U.S. at 262,
31 S.Ct. at 574.
The Defendant, however, contends that
Section 2 of Article 7477b is not a burden
on or interference with interstate com
merce for two reasons. First, as evi
denced by Section 1 of Article 7477b, the
purpose and intent of Section 2 is to con
serve and protect the water resources of
the State by regulating the withdrawal
of water from underground sources, and,
second, since the statute here in question
operates on and regulates underground
water, which is not the subject of ab
solute ownership, it does not affect a
substance which is a subject of com
merce. In support of his second conten
tion, the Defendant asserts the cases of
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. State
of West Virginia and West v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., relied upon by the
Plaintiffs, are distinguishable from this
C2se, and that the cases of Williams v.
City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d
578 (1962) appeal dism. 375 U.S. 7, S4
S.Ct. 46, 11 L.Ed.2d 38, reh. den. 375
U.S. 936, 84 S.Ct. 328, 11 L.Ed.2d 267,
and Knight v. Grimes. 80 S.D. 517, 127
N.W.2d 708 (1964), are controlling.
In regard to the Defendant's first con
tention, we observe the assertion therein
is not a novel one. This contention wsf
considered in both Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia
and West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 3c
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the West case, the State of Oklahoma as
serted that it had the right to conserve,
or rather the right to reserve, the re
sources of the state for the use of its
inhabitants. In answer thereto, the Su
preme Court stated:
"The results of the contention repel
its acceptance. Gas, when reduced to
possession, is a commodity; it belongs
to the owner of the land; and, when
reduced to possession, is his individ
ual property, subject to sale by him,
snd may be a subject of intrastate com
merce and interstate commerce. The
statute of Oklahoma recognizes it to
be a subject of intrastate commerce,
but seeks to prohibit it from being the
subject of interstate commerce, and
this is the purpose of its conservation.
In other words, the purpose of its con
servation is in a sense commercial—the
business welfare of the state, as coal
might be, or timber. Both of these
products might be limited in amount,
and the same consideration of the pub
lic welfare which would confine gas
to the use of the inhabitants of a state
would confine them to the inhabitants
of the state. If the states have such
power, a singular situation might re
sult. Pennsylvania might keep its coal,
the Northwest its timber, the mining
states their minerals. And why may
not the products of the field be brought
within the principle ?" 221 U.S. at 255,
31 S.Ct. at 571.
In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
State of West Virginia, the Supreme
Court again expressed disapproval of
this contention, stating:
"Another consideration advanced to
the same end is that natural pas is a
natural product of the state and has
become a necessity therein, that the
supply is waning and no longer suffi
cient to satisfy locai needs and be used
abroad, and that the act is therefore a
legitimate measure of conservation in
the interest of the people of the state.
If the situation be as stated, it affords
no ground for the assumption by the
state of the power to regulate inter
state commerce, which is what the act
839
attempts to do. That power is lodged
elsewhere." 262 U.S. at 598, 43 S.Ct.
at 665.
[17] Also, the fact that Section 1 of
Article 7477b declares that the purpose
and intent of such Article ib "to conserve
and protect all water resources both pub
lic and private" does not bind the Plain
tiffs, and they may show that the statute
in its practical operation is an unreason
able burden on interstate commerce.
Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,
278 U.S. 1, 10, 49 S.Ct. 1, 73 L.Ed. 147
(1928).
The Defendant seeks to support his
position that Section 2 of Article 7477b
is a valid and reasonable exercise of the
police power on the theory that Section 2
acts only upon uncaptured water, which
has no owner, or, if there is an owner,
it is the common property of the State
of Texas. To support this theory and his
general position that under any view the
statute is a reasonable exercise of the
police power, the Defendant relies pri
marily upon Greer v. State of Connecti
cut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600, 40 L.Ed.
793 (1896) ; Hudson County Water Com
pany v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 28 S.Ct
529, 52 L.Ed. 828 (1908); Knight v.
Grimes, supra, and Williams v. City of
Wichita, supra.
[18] In our opinion, none of the
above cases presents sufficient authority
for this court to disregard the holdings
of the cases of Commonwealth of Penn
sylvania v. State of West Virginia, and
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., which
are found to be controlling on the issue
presented herein. Cor.sidering the stat
ute in question only with regard to wheth
er it regulates the transportation and use
of water after it has been withdrawn
from a well and becomes personal prop
erty, such statute constitutes an unrea
sonable burden upon and interference
with interstate commerce. Moreover, on
the facts of this case it appear to us that
Section 2 of Article 7477b does not have
for its purpose, nor does it operate to con
serve water resources of the State of
Texas except in the sense that it does so
for her own benefit to the detriment of
K-32
g^>
840 255 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT
her sister States as in the case of West
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. In the name
of conservation, the statute seeks to pro
hibit interstate shipments of water while
indulging in the substantial discrimina
tion of permitting the unrestricted intra-
state production and transportation of
water between points within the State, no
matter how distant; for example, from
Wilbarger County to El Paso County,
Texas. Obviously, the statute had little
relation to the cause of conservation.
[19-21] Under the law of the State
of Texas, a landowner has the right to
drill wells and appropriate all the under
ground percolating waters found to his
own purposes, and if, in the exercise of
such right, he intercepts or drains off
water from beneath his neighbor's land,
this inconvenience to his neighbor falls
within the description of damnum absque
injuria, which cannot be the ground of
an action. City of Corpus Christi v.
City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276
S.W.2d 798 (1955), Houston & T. C. Ky.
Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279
(1904). This right to enter upon the
land and appropriate underground per
colating waters is an interest in real
estate, and may be exercised by the land
owner or made the subject of an inde
pendent grant of ownership. Evanr v.
Ropte. 128 Tex. 7b, 9G S.W.2d 973 (3936 V
Fur her. after the waver ha? beer, sppro-
jrifsted. tht landowner, his lfr?ef cr as
sign, ha? the ri^hi to r-zV- the water to
others for use off of the land and outside
the basin where produced, just as he could
sell any other species of property. City
of Corpus Christi v. City of Plessanton,
154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d at 802 (1955);
Pecos County Water Control & Improve
ment Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d
503, 505 (Tex.Civ.App.1954, err. ref. n. r.
e.) ; Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16,
15. Article TSS0-3c. subsection D. provides:
"Tlif ownership end rights of the owner
of ihe land, his lessees nnd assigns, in un
derground water are hereby recop-ized.
and nothing in this Section 3c shall h»»
construed as depriving or divesting K'scii
296 S.W. 273, 278, 54 A.L.R. 1397 (1927;
These rights, although not codified, have
been generally recognized by statute as
property rights of sufficient charactej
for ownership. Art. 7880-3c, subsection
D, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.Stats. and Art
7477b, Section 7, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.
Stats.16 Thus, except for Section 2 of
Article 7477b, the general law of the
State of Texas, which recognizes water
that has been withdrawn from under
ground sources as personal property sub
ject to sale and commerce, would allow
the Plaintiffs to withdraw water from
the Mock's land and transport same to the
City of Altus.
This statute, however, seeks to prohibit
the production of underground water for
the purpose of transporting same in in
terstate, commerce, and has the effect of
prohibiting the interstate transportation
of such water after it has become person
al property. Whether a statute by its
phraseology prohibits the interstate
transportation of an article of commerce
after it has become the personal property
of someone as in the Pennsylvania and
West- cases, or prohibits the withdrawal
of such substance where the intent is to
transport such in interstate commerce,
the result upon interstate commerce is
the same. In both situations, the purpose
?nd intent of the statute and the end re
sult thereof is to prohibit the interstate
transportation of an article of commerce.
Clearly, then, Section 2 of this statute
constitutes an unreasonable burden upon
interstate commerce. Plaintiffs should
not be denied by the provisions of such
statute the right to withdraw and move
water in interstate commerce.
The relief prayed for by the Plaintiff?
is in all things granted, and judgment
will be entered accordingly.
owner, his assigns or lessees, of such own-
n--* :(i or rijrhts, subject, however to tlie
_.,i..r . ■. regulations promulgated pursu-
art U .»5f Section 3c." The above is
iDivr^uraT^d almost verbatim in Section






The judgment and all provisions thereof in the case of Adelbert A.
Weiland, as state engineer of Colorado, et al. v. The Pioneer Irrigation
Company, decided June 5, 1922, and reported in 259 U. S. 498, affecting
the Pioneer irrigation ditch or canal, are hereby recognized as binding upon
the states; and Colorado, through its duly authorized officials, shall have the
perpetua] and exclusive right to control and regulate diversions of water at
all times by said canal in conformity with said judgment.
The water heretofore adjudicated to said Pioneer Canal by the district court
of Colorado, in the amount of fifty (50) cubic feet per second of time is
included in and is a part of the total amounts of water hereinbefore allocated
for beneficial consumptive use in Colorado and Nebraska.
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